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The aim of the paper is to evaluate the consequences of the Spanish housing crisis on 
the banking system. The Spanish crisis is due to an over production of dwellings. We 
first analyze the different factors of the crisis. Institutional factors crippled the housing 
market and make it more prone to speculative behavior. There were also external 
factors such as cheap interest rates or the divergences of price competiveness inside the 
Euro zone. Then we analyze the real difficulties of the Spanish banking system. The 
banking system has financed households and entrepreneurs during this housing bubble. 
Doubtful loans from households used to be a major source of repayment’s difficulties. 
Households still to be a large part of doubtful loans, but entrepreneurs from the housing 
sectors (construction and real estate) contribute to the doubtful loans increase. The 
entrepreneurs’ contribution to doubtful loans is always forgotten by official data and we 
explain why this information should not be ignored. At the end, the paper tries to give 
some order of height of this Spanish crisis, relatively to the banks’ equity capital.  
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The subprime crisis has retained much of the public attention since 2007. Nevertheless, 
European countries had also endured several assets inflation linked to the low level of 
the interest rates since 2001. Among the Euro zone, the effects of the Spanish housing 
crisis should be analyzed carefully. The main facts about the Spanish housing bubble 
are particularly striking. The Spanish economy has produced a stock of 2 millions of 
empty accommodations in 2010, the same amount than the US subprime crisis. The 
Spanish GDP represents 10% of the USA GDP and the Spanish population is 6 times 
lower than the American one. This brief sum up of the Spanish situation shows its 
particular severity. The aim of the paper is not to establish a comparison between the 
American subprime crisis and the Spanish housing crisis. It will be worthless to set up a 
virtual competition between two very different cases. The aim of the paper is to explain 
the origins of the Spanish housing crisis and to examine the risks born by the Spanish 
banking system. The Spanish banking system is facing an increase in the amount of 
doubtful loans. The major part of this increase is due to housing crisis. Banks has taken 
risks on the supply side of the housing market by financing construction projects and 
real estate services. They have also taken risks on the demand side by financing 
households with variable interest rate loans. The official communication is only done 
with the rate of doubtful loans from the households. The paper provides several 
evidences that the risks born by Spanish banking system are under evaluated.  
 
II.     THE ORIGINS OF THE SPANISH HOUSING BUBBLE 
 
Spanish economy was stricken by a very severe recession since the end of 2007. At the 
mid 2011, the rate of unemployment has reached more than 20% of the workforce, the 
government faces a difficult fiscal situation and the interest rate gap for treasury bonds 
with Germany is widening. The Spanish economy has built up 2 millions of empty 
dwellings, and we will first examine the causes of the crisis. There are institutional and 
external factors such as the euro zone mechanisms, but there also Spanish internal 
causes.  
First of all, a market economy depends on the price mechanism. In the Spanish 
case, two main prices were manipulated, and for a long time, these prices couldn’t 
produce the necessary adjustment. The exchange rate and interest rate has created 
incentives for Spanish entrepreneurs to invest in the housing sector. During the 2001-
2007 period, Spain was able to finance its public debt and all the housing projects with 
very cheap interest rates. The Spanish interest rate was very near to the German one, 
but the risks and the productivity of the Spanish economy were very different from 
Germany.  
Spain belongs to the Euro zone, so its economy has to compete with other 
European countries under a fixed exchange rate regime. Spanish economy has suffered 
more inflation and less productivity gains than the other Euro zone countries such as 
Germany. The lack of price competiveness prevents Spanish entrepreneurs to succeed 
in tradable goods industries. So the Spanish entrepreneurs preferred to develop non-
tradable goods industries such as real estate, construction or tourism.  
The asset inflation in housing also depends on the characteristics of the Spanish 
housing market. Owners dominate Spanish housing market, and the rental market is 
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marginal: owners occupy 85% of the accommodations and only 15% are available for 
rental.
1
 The rental market is crippled by an over protecting regulation for tenants.
2
 This 
regulation prevents people to buy flats in order to rent them. There is a paradox about 
housing in Spain: the Spanish economy has produced a lot of accommodations but 
young people stay for a very long time with their parents because there are not enough 
accommodations available for rent, and the ownership is not affordable for them. The 
housing bubble has prospered on a speculative behavior. Spaniards bought 
accommodations in order to sell them after and to get a value added by the increasing 
market prices. These expectations on the increase in prices were only validated during 
the first part of the cycle. This crisis is cruelly ironic: in spite of an over production on 
the housing market, there is always a crisis on the lack of accommodation. The 
weakness of the rental market is due to institutional factors that have not been modified.  
 
A. Macroeconomic Environment: Interest Rates and Real Exchange Rate 
 
The first cause of the crisis is the divergence between productivity gains inside the euro 
zone. Spanish economy lose its price competitiveness so non-tradable goods industries 
appeared to be more profitable than tradable goods industries. The lack of 
competitiveness is clearly showed by the OECD statistics. Between 1995 and 2008, 
inflation was higher in Spain than in Germany. The pace of the Spanish inflation was 
two times higher than the German’s one. Moreover, even if the growth of the Spanish 
GDP seems to be superior to the German GDP, a large part of the Spanish growth is an 
illusion. The Spanish GDP depends on the housing market, and there is no sustainable 
growth when an economy produces services or products with no real demand. Last but 
not least, Spanish productivity gains are near zero but wages costs increased by 50%. 
During the same period Germany increased its productivity by 25% and the wages costs 
only by 2% (see Figure 1). This grossly statement hides a worse reality, because the 
Spanish economy had mainly created growth in non-tradable goods industries where 
there are no productivity gains. The illustrations of macroeconomic divergences are 
sum up in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1  
Inflation, GDP, productivity and wage costs: the main changes in the Euro zone 1995-
2008 (data from OECD) 
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The second cause is the cheap money policy. Spain has enjoyed a long period of 
very low interest rate. The interest rate has stimulated the supply side of the housing 
market by reducing the financing costs of the condominiums projects. On the demand 
side, the low interest rate has encouraged households to go on debt. Spanish households 
had borrowed massively on variable interest rate loans. 98% of the loans are with 
variable interest rate, and the private Spanish debt represented 64.6 % of the GDP in 
2009,
3
 against 31.6 % in 2001.
4
 Spanish households are in a financial predicament, 
because they are trapped between increasing repayments of loans (due to higher interest 
rates), falling houses prices and massive unemployment. 
This house bubble has flourished because the traditional adjustment mechanisms 
were prevented to act. The euro zone prevented Spain to devaluate the money to restore 
external competitiveness reduced by wages inflation. The low interest rate was 
disconnected from the real risk of overheating of the Spanish economy. With an 
autonomous monetary policy may the interest rate would have been raised sooner to 
prevent the assets inflation. So the macroeconomic causes of the crisis have facilitated 
the construction speculation. Moreover, on fiscal side, this asset inflation was very 
welcome by Spanish authorities (local, regional and national) because it has generated a 
lot of taxes (tax on value added on new construction and taxes on houses sales). The 
apparent fiscal equilibrium of the Spanish budget during the 2000-2007 periods is 
mainly due to the tax paid on the housing market. This situation has last till 2007, when 
several facts had changed. First the interest rates started to increase, then several 
corruption scandals around housing projects appeared and Spanish people began to 
discover that some of the condominiums have been built in the middle of nowhere, with 
sometime no access to water and generally with no real demand to live in these towns.  
 
B. The Specificities of the Spanish Housing Market 
 
Spanish housing market has known a fluctuation not only on a nominal basis with asset 
price inflation, but there was a real consequence on the number of construction. Spanish 
economy has increased the quantity of accommodations produced every year and there 
is now a large stock of empty houses. The Spanish population has increased by 13% 
between 2001 and 2008, and the total amount of accommodation has increased by 20%. 
Demographic indicators do not explain this difference: there was 5.5 million of new 
accommodation constructed but only 3.5 million of new households has appeared 
between 1997 and 2006.
5
 During the same period the number of new accommodations 
increased from 200,000 to merely 600,000 each years (see Figure 2). The market for 
new accommodation was already saturated in 2006, but 2007 and 2008 added 1.2 
million of new dwellings. The paradox of this over production is that it did not solve 
the much stressed situation on the housing market. This situation is due to the fact that a 
large part of these new accommodations were built for tourism or for holiday homes 
buyers. Spain has a ratio of 164 holiday homes for 1,000 inhabitants higher than the 
European average around 72 holiday homes for 1,000 inhabitants.
6
 But the main feature 
of this over production is that Spanish entrepreneurs has build condominiums in places 
with no demand because there is no job, or not enough water available, or no means to 
get easily to a center of interest. At the same time, old constructions built during the 
Franco era, are not rehabilitated. In spite of their good localization, these old buildings 
lose  their  occupants.  All  these  elements  contributed  to  maintain  a  scarcity  for the    









accommodations really demanded by the market. So the prices had continuously 
increased till 2006, especially due to a demand sustained by cheap interest rates.  
 
C. The Main Facts of the Housing Crisis 
 
Housing prices had increased by 50% between 2001 and 2006 (see Figure 3). The 
prices seemed to increase till mid 2008, but the market has already plummeted. In fact, 
the number of transactions drop and the value of the transaction felt down since 2006. 
The lag between prices and the number of transactions has two significations: first the 
market started to plummet on large surface accommodation and then the transactions 
are only made with smaller surface accommodation. When the prices are too high for 
the households the demand simply disappears. This phenomenon always starts with the 
largest housing surfaces because it demands the largest budget to buy them, so these 
largest surfaces are the first stricken by the vanishing demand. The second feature is the 
resistance to the falling prices from the owners. Prices have remained relatively stable 
during 2007 and 2008, and they started to drop in 2009. This resistance is due to the 
fact that Spanish owners bought accommodation in order to speculate on increasing 
prices. They did not buy for occupy or for rental. If they have enough liquidity to pay 
the loan, they can wait some time with the secret hope to sell at the expected price. This 
situation will change with time and the level of interest rates. An increase in interest 
rate will increase the value of the repayments, and then will motivate owners to accept 
diminishing prices. 
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Figure 3  




III.        SPANISH BANKS AND DOUBTFULL LOANS 
 
The last official data published by Spanish authorities in March 2011 on the doubtful 
loan rate was 6.2%. It means that 6.2% of the loans granted are doubtful, but the 
Spanish authorities only consider the doubtful loans from households. There are also 
doubtful loans from financing the supply side of the economy, especially construction 
and real estate services. The risk of doubtful loans is very difficult to evaluate. The 
classification “doubtful loans” is never a good sign for the banks, but some doubtful 
loans may be pay back completely and some will not be paid back at all. Between these 
two extremes there are plenty of cases where the doubtful loans will be partially paid 
back. There is no available information on the potential real losses that the banks will 
suffer on doubtful loans. Anyway we try to give a more realistic evaluation of the 
quantity of the doubtful loans, and the potential risk by comparing the amount of 
doubtful loans with bank’s equity capital. 




loansdoubtfulofRate   
 
A. Doubtful Loans from Financing Productive Activities 
 
During the 2005-2007 period, the contribution of the construction and real estate 
sectors to the doubtful loans had no real signification. Since 2008, these sectors had a 
real contribution, and for 2010, they gave a third of the total of doubtful loans. It should 
not be forgotten to evaluate the exposition to the risk of the bank. 
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Table 1  









loans in real 
estate sector 
Total rate of 
doubtful loans in 
construction and 
real estate sector 
Rate of doubtful 
loans in other 
productive 
activities sectors 




2005 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 
2006 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 
2007 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
2008 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 0.6% 2.0% 
2009 0.6% 1.8% 2.4% 1.0% 3.4% 
2010 0.8% 2.4% 3.2% 1.2% 4.3% 
  
 
B.  Doubtful Loans from Financing Household 
 
The effects of the crisis appear after 2007. The data presented here are the data used by 
authority to measure the risk exposition of the banking system. The increase of bad 
loans is the direct consequences of the collapse of the housing market. There is a lag 
between the two phenomena. The crisis on the housing market started in 2007, but the 
bad loans accumulation had began between 12 and 18 months later. 
 
Table 2 
Rate of household doubtful loans among the total amount 
 of credit (data from Banco de España) 
 









C. Evaluation of the Risks 
 
The analysis of the risks born by Spanish banks shows two main features. First, the 
contribution of the housing market activities (financing construction, real estate and 
households) to the doubtful loans represents around 85-90% of the total amount of the 
doubtful loans. This share increases from 73% in 2005 to 88% in 2010. There is an 
increase of the quantity of doubtful loans in real and relative value. Between 2005 and 
2010, the total amount of credit is multiplied by 1.5, the amount of doubtful loans in all 
housing activities by 15 (in construction sector by 19 and real estate sector by 71).  
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Table 3  













2005 100 100 100 100 100 
2006 125 113 86 112 111 
2007 146 169 154 260 173 
2008 155 655 1032 3157 820 
2009 152 969 1531 5292 1248 
2010 153 1113 1920 7177 1506 
 
 
This increasing risk must be put in perspective with the change of the structure 
of lending since 2002. Between 2002 and 2007, the total amount of loans made to 
finance productive activities (nearly everything but loans to households) had increased 
by 2.5. The amount of loans to the construction sector increased by 2.7 and for the real 
estate by 5.6. This is the bank side of the housing crisis. 
The second feature given by the risk analysis shows the critical incidence of this 
accumulation of doubtful loans. Spanish banking system is facing a financial 
predicament. The doubtful loans represent in 2010 more than 130% of the equity capital 
and more than 8% of the total assets of the Spanish banking system. Here again, the 
data show a collapse since 2008. Anyway, these data should be interpreted very 
carefully because there is not available information on the reality of doubtful loans. 
First, the amount of doubtful loans can be misevaluated. Second, there is no 
information on the percentage of the losses really supported by the banks, because some 
of the doubtful loans will be repaid, and some will be partially repaid. So if the figure 




Equity capital, total assets and doubtful loans (data from Banco de España) 
 
Years 
Doubtful loans in % of Spanish 
banks’ equity capital 
Doubtful loans in % of Spanish 
banks’ total assets 
2005 21,87% 0,99% 
2006 19,96% 1,00% 
2007 22,53% 1,27% 
2008 85,64% 4,94% 
2009 120,31% 7,34% 
2010 130,99% 8,34% 
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Nevertheless, some external indications show that the Spanish banks will have 
very great difficulties to be paid back. Some of constructions have been built in areas 
with no real demand. There are numerous areas in Spain with empty flats, and no hope 
to rent or to sell them. The loans that had financed this type of housing will be never 
paid back. Moreover, the crisis has completely stopped the Spanish economy, and put 
nearly 20% of the workforce on unemployment. The households will be facing 
difficulties to pay back their loans. The mortgage loans were contracted with variable 
interest rates. The end of the cheap money period is increasing interest rates. The 
consequence of higher interest rates is to increase the difficulties of the households to 
pay their loans. 
 
IV.       CONCLUSION  
 
The Spanish economy is in a dire predicament and the factors that crippled the 
economy have not been removed and will last for a long time. Unfortunately the 
Spanish crisis scenario is more prone to be like the Japanese long lasting crisis since 
1989 than a fast recovery scenario. Spanish authorities’ agenda should focus on two 
main issues. First they have to reform the housing market in order to restore the 
mobility of the workforce. There are several measures that could ease the transactions 
on the housing market such as reducing protective regulation on the tenants or 
diminishing the transaction costs (taxes), which are among the higher in Europe. Also 
more housing disposable for rental would increase the mobility of the workforce and 
reduce the unemployment rate. 
The second issue concerns the risk of default of the banking system. The 
accumulation of doubtful loans may lead to a recapitalization of the banks. 
Nevertheless, there is a narrow path between saving the banking system and delaying 
the necessary adjustment. The bubble has not completely exploded and for now the 
market adjustment has been made on quantities and not on prices. Housing prices have 
not decreased enough and saving the banking system could make the crisis during 
longer. Saving the banks with no counterparty will lead to validate false expectations on 
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